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The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A
New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign
Country Judgments
Yaad Rotem*
Conventional law and economics analysis overlooks a significant feature of the law of
recognition offoreign county judgments-an area of the law that regulates the private local
practical use of such judgments. The existing literature on the topic current describes two
competing economic hypotheses as relevant to modeling the incentives of countries to recognize
foreign countg judgments. The first describes a (repeated) prisoner's dilemma game. An
alternative economic hypothesis argues that countries envisage cooperation as a weakL dominant
strategy. This Article offers a new economic rationale based on an asymmetric information
explanation. I arue that no county can identify, at any given moment, whether or not another
given country is appying a recognition regime that is as cooperative as the regime applied by it,
or whether the foreign jurisdiction is appying a less receptive regime. Each county therefore
fears that the foreign jurisdiction is implementing either a "selective" recognition regime, under
which the relative lack of cooperation with the forum is driven by a deliberate agenda, or a
"sporadic" recognition regime, under which the foreign county turns out to be less receptive to
the forum'sjudgments as a result of mere coincidence.
The new economic rationale has several positive and normative implications, relating to
cooperation between countries. Four are discussed in this Article. First, registration offoreign
judgments, as a method for localiing foreign judgments, is shown to be superior to mere
recognition, inasmuch as cooperation with other countries is the goal. Second, attempts to form
inter-county recognition agreements (conventions and treaties) that ignore the problem ofprivateinformation are exposed as futile. Third, the reciprod requirement, the relevance of which as a
prerequisite for recognition is current~ the subject of heaty debate in the US, is also shown to
be unnecessay. Fourth, countries should in limited, enumerated circumstances, concede to the
local legal effect of certain unrecognized foreign judgments.
Assistant Professor, Center of Law & Business, Ramat-Gan (email: rotem@clb.ac.il). The Article
benefitted from the comments of Yuval Procaccia, Pablo Lerner, Maya Goldring and Uri Ben-
Oliel. I thank Gabriel Rosenberg for excellent editing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most fundamental tenet of the law of recognition of foreign country
judgments-an area of the law that regulates the private practical' use 2 of
foreign3 judgments-prescribes that foreign judgments have no local legal
I Recognition of foreign judgments concerns the practical, rather than the academic, use of foreign
judgments. A foreign judgment is used "academically" when it serves for comparative purposes,
the classic example being of a court referring to the foreign judgment as a precedent rendered by
another legal system. A practical use of foreign judgments envisions a change in legal
entitlements, the classic example being of a creditor enforcing a foreign judgment on a debtor,
thus forcing the debtor to make good on an obligation pronounced by the foreign judgment.
2 A foreign judgment can be used in at least three contexts, depending on the relevant
circumstances: first, for enforcement of in-personam judgments against local assets by any way of
a levy of execution (such as obtaining a writ of execution and delivering it to the local marshal for
execution); the classic example being a money judgment. Second, for res judicata purposes in civil
proceedings. The foreign judgment is utilized in this context to create a preclusive effect, either
claim preclusion or issue preclusion. See Eugene F. Scoles, et al, Conflict of Laws 1264-67 (West
4th ed 2004). Third, as evidence before an administrative agency which contemplates the relevant
factual basis upon which to render its decision. The foreign judgment serves as evidence to prove
a fact which has already been established by the judgment.
3 "Foreign" shall be defined in the international sense, as in judgments rendered by the courts of
another country.
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effect. 4 The prevailing party cannot use it in any way to the detriment of the
opposing party.5 A formal legal process6 of recognition7 by the local forum8 is
required in order to make a foreign judgment legally effective in the forum.9
Such a formal recognition process entails an examination of several peripheral
issues, including the jurisdiction of the foreign court to give the judgment,'0 the
finality of the judgment," compliance of the proceedings in which the foreign
judgment was obtained with the forum's principles of natural justice and due
4 See, for example, Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163 (1895) ("No law has any effect, of its own force,
beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the
law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act,
or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends
upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity of nations.' Although the
phrase has been often criticized, no satisfactory substitute has been suggested."); Scoles, et al,
Co;flid of Lays at 1268 (cited in note 2); Lawrence Collins, et al, eds, Dicy, Monis and Collins on the
Conflict of Laws, 567 (Sweet & Maxwell 14th ed 2006). In the US, the Constitution mandates
extraterritorial recognition and enforcement of sister state and federal judgments. It is a mandate
embodied in the full faith and credit clause. See Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 297-98 (Little,
Brown 2d ed 1995). The US Constitution does not, however, address judgments obtained in other
countries, and does not accord full faith and credit to such judgments. See Aetna ife Insurance Co v
Tremblay, 223 US 185, 190 (1912).
5 I also refer to these, respectively, as the foreign-judgment creditor and the foreign-judgment
debtor.
6 1 am using the term "process" to emphasize that recognition sometimes occurs as a part of an
ongoing legal proceeding, and does not always require a separate legal proceeding.
7 There is in fact a difference between enforcement and recognition. While recongition is
declaratory, enforcement requires recognition and the forum to exert its powers of executing
judgments. Enforcement cannot be accomplished absent recognition but recognition does not
necessarily entail enforcement. As not all foreign judgments require enforcement, only the term
recognition shall be used in this Article. For the difference between enforcement and recognition
of foreign judgments, see Guinness PLC v Ward, 955 F2d 875, 889 (4th Cir 1992).
8 The forum country is the local country in which recognition of the foreign judgment is sought.
9 US law of foreign judgments is mostly state law. See Erie v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938) (finding,
not in the specific context of foreign judgments recognition, that in the absence of a federal
statute or treaty or some other basis for federal jurisdiction, state law applies). Thus, arguments
raised in this Article shall refer mostly to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§
481-86 (1987 & Supp 2007) or to a model statute-the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, which was approved in 1962 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Country Laws and the American Bar Association. The latter Act codifies the common
law applied by the majority of courts in the US, although many states have enacted changes and
additions. In 2005 the Act was revised and was renamed the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act. The 2005 Act introduces several important changes, which shall also
be discussed. Note, however, that a recent American Law Institute initiative is proposing that
recognition of foreign judgments be regulated by a federal statute. See Am Law Inst, Recogniion
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute 3-6 (2006) ("AL Proposal").
10 See, for example, The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962, § 4(a)(2-3);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 482(1)(b), 2(a).
11 See, for example, The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 at § 2.
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process, 2 and lack of contradiction between the foreign judgment and the
forum's principles of public policy.'3 The examination deliberately ignores the
merits of the dispute as the dispute has already been litigated before the foreign
forum. 14
Understanding the incentives of countries to allow recognition of foreign
judgments is crucial to understanding the law in this area. The law concerning
recognition of foreign country judgments, much like other conflict of laws
(private international law) rules, regulates a dispute that, in essence, is private. In
the classical scenario, a private entity or person seeks to enforce locally a foreign
judgment against another private entity or person. However, each nation is,
through its sovereignty, able to unilaterally decide whether and how it will use
the judgments of another nation's courts. Nations will only give effect to foreign
judgments if doing so is in the nation's best interest. Understanding the
incentives of countries to allow recognition of foreign judgments, as
distinguished from the incentives of individuals to seek or avoid recognition of a
particular foreign judgment, is therefore very much relevant, as each forum can
ease or impose attempts to locally use foreign judgments, hence improving or
undermining cooperation with other countries. The case of the People's
Republic of China provides an interesting case study. China's laws formally
entertain the possibility of recognizing foreign judgments, but in reality foreign
judgments have rarely been recognized by its courts. 5 Such a state of affairs can
hardly be attributed to the incentives of foreign-judgment creditors but rather to
a policy decision made by the state.
Despite its importance, the question of incentives of countries has not
been adequately explored in the literature. There are currently two competing
hypotheses. 16 The first analogizes countries to captured criminals in the
canonical prisoner's dilemma. 17 Each individual country prefers that its own
12 See id at § 4; Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 482(1)(a), (2)(b).
13 See, for example, The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 § 4(b)(3);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 482(2)(d).
14 See Johnston v Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 NE 121, 123 (NY 1926).
15 See Lu Song, The EOS Engineering Corporation Case and the Nemo Debet Bis Vexari Pro Una et
Eadem Causa Principle in China, 7 Chinese J Intl L 143, 156 (2008); Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the
People's Republic of China: An Introduction for International Investors, 7 Chi J Ind L 133, 167 (2006);
Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enfordng and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a US Judgment Creditor's
Perspective, 36 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 757, 758-759 (2004).
16 See Michael J. Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 23 Melb U L Rev 4i6, 420-28 (1999). See also Michael J. Whincop and Mary Keyes,
Polig and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws 157-60 (Ashgate 2001).
17 Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 421-22 (cited in note 16). For an explanation of the game in a
different context of international law, see Andrew T. Guzman, Hoxy International Law Works. A
Rational Choice Theoy 30-32 (Oxford 2008).
Vol. 10 No. 2
The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition
judgments be recognized whenever possible, since extensive worldwide
recognition generates an incentive for litigants to choose that country as a
litigation venue and ensures that the legal outcome pronounced by the forum's
judgments becomes truly relevant and effective.' 8 For the international legal
system as a whole, an agreement to enforce foreign judgments seems ideal. Such
cooperation would engender cooperation and reduce the overall costs of
litigation. 19 However, no country rushes to recognize foreign judgments.2"
Countries are reluctant to recognize foreign judgments in order to protect local
defendants, to encourage an incoming transfer of assets and capital, and to allow
additional litigation and increased income for certain influential groups. 2' As a
sovereign entity, no country can be compelled to recognize foreign judgments.
Moreover, in this game, even a formal commitment to cooperate cannot be
credible. Thus, each country is rationally driven in this game by an incentive to
"defect., 22 However, since recognition of foreign judgments is in fact an
iterated, repetitive game, with an indefinite horizon, long-term incentives
outweigh short-term ones.23 Cooperation between countries is readily induced
under such circumstances, as countries can punish one another for defection.24
Consequently, sovereign countries around the world have accepted the
obligation of effecting foreign judgments and have constituted their legal
regimes accordingly.25
18 See Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 421-23 (cited in note 16).
19 See id at 421-22.
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 422 (cited in note 16). In a prisoner's dilemma game, mutual
cooperation can maximize the parties' payoff but each player does better by defecting. See
Guzman, Rational Choice at 30 (cited in note 17) (discussing an example in the international
context).
23 See Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 419 (cited in note 16).
24 This is an implementation of Robert Axelrod's famous insight. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution
of Cooperalion 4 (Basic 1984). See also Guzman, Rational Choice at 41 (cited in note 17). One such
strategy is "tit-for-tat." For an explanation, see Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An
Introduction to Game Theogy 130-31 (Blackwell 4th ed, 2007).
25 See, for example, Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962, Prefatory Note
(cited in note 10) ("In a large number of civil law countries, grant of conclusive effect to money-
judgments from foreign courts is made dependent upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in the
United States have in many instances been refused recognition abroad either because the foreign
court was not satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the American jurisdiction
involved or because no certification of existence of reciprocity could be obtained from the foreign
government in countries where existence of reciprocity must be certified to the courts by the
government. Codification by a country of its rules on the recognition of money-judgments
rendered in a foreign court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the country will be
recognized abroad.").
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An alternative hypothesis argues that countries recognize at least some
foreign judgments because it directly benefits them through economic savings
rather than only through inducement of similar behavior from other nations.26
Recognizing foreign judgments decreases litigation costs for the parties and
relieves the forum's overcrowded courts. The relevant assumption is that
recognition of a foreign judgment would be a cheaper process by which to settle
the dispute than litigating the dispute to its merits the second time. 2' The effect
of recognition by other countries is appreciated, but secondary. Recognition is
thus a weakly dominant strategy-in other words, one that is always at least as
good as any other strategy, but may be better than other strategies depending on
how the other player acts." Thus, even if the other country does not cooperate,
the forum is still better off recognizing certain foreign judgments from that
country.
Neither of these hypotheses has won the day; conflicting evidence supports
both.29 For example, the prisoners' dilemma hypothesis is undermined by the
demise of the reciprocity requirement, which suggests that countries do not
attempt to punish one another for non-recognition.3 ° On the other hand,
countries do try to "cheat" one another by expanding their jurisdiction on
occasion. 31
This Article provides a new hypothesis, which presents the issues of
recognition as a problem of asymmetric information.32 A forum would prefer
that its judgments always be recognized abroad while retaining the ability to pick
and choose which foreign judgments it itself recognizes. The worst-case scenario
for a forum in this regard is to recognize foreign judgments but have its own
26 See Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 422 (cited in note 16).
27 See id. Of course, it is an assumption that in some cases could be refuted. Consider for example a
case in which the dispute itself is simple to adjudicate, but as it was litigated in a certain foreign
country, complex questions arise regarding the recognition of a foreign judgment from that
country. For economic analysis purposes suffice to assume that in most disputes, recognition of
the foreign judgment would be a cheaper way to settle the dispute than to relitigate it to its merits.
28 Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 237-38
(Oxford 1995). Consider an example for a weakly dominant strategy, as demonstrated in the
famous "beauty contest" game. In this game, two people are asked to choose simultaneously a
number between zero and 100, while they are told that the winner will be the one to choose the
number closest to two-thirds of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy in
this game is to choose the number zero.
29 See Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 424-28 (cited in note 16).
30 Id at 424.
31 Id at 425.
32 Consider George A. Akerlof, The Market For Lemons: Qualitalive Uncertainy and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970) (providing an overview of the concept of asymmetrical
information, and demonstrating how asymmetric information can impact decision-making).
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judgments ignored abroad. In order to prevent this last situation, and to still
ensure that its own judgments are recognized abroad, some form of cooperation
of the forum with the foreign country is therefore inevitable.
The problem, however, is one of private information. This problem
emanates from the forum's inability to compare the recognition regime applied
by the foreign country, the judgments of which are considered by the forum for
cooperative recognition, to the forum's own regime. As a result, the forum
cannot identify at any given moment whether or not any particular foreign
country is applying a recognition regime that is as cooperative as the regime it
itself applies, or whether the foreign jurisdiction is applying a less receptive
regime. When faced with a foreign jurisdiction rejecting one of its judgments,
the forum must decide whether the recognition regime is "selective," meaning it
is driven by a deliberate agenda, or "sporadic," a result of mere coincidence
relating to the judgment itself rather than inter-country relationships. The
information is asymmetric. Any country knows what rubric it is truly applying
(rather than just professing to apply) when deciding whether to accept a foreign
judgments, while the rest of the world does not.
The new economic rationale offered here provides several normative and
positive implications for countries interested in cooperation. This Article focuses
on four ongoing policy debates that are currently troubling lawmakers
considering reform in the law of foreign country judgments.
The first policy debate upon which this Article sheds new light concerns
the question of recognition versus registration. A survey of common law
jurisdictions reveals that recognition of foreign judgments is in fact available
either in a "registration" track or in a "recognition" track. The difference
between these two tracks turns on whether the foreign-judgment creditor is
placed with any burden, including the relatively costly burden of proof with
regard to any facts, prior to having the foreign judgment accepted into the
forum's legal system (the recognition track), or not (the registration track).
Countries that need a solution to the problem of private information described
in the Article can find it by devising a signaling mechanism. The law fills an
important role here, as the necessary signal can only be devised if the law of
foreign judgments entertains it. I argue that resorting to registration rather than
to recognition serves as an observable and costly signal that provides other
countries with a credible commitment of the forum's interest in cooperation.33
Second, the pursuit of inter-country foreign judgments recognition
agreements-conventions and treaties-that aim to ensure mutual recognition
33 See Section III.A.
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of foreign judgments, is, for the most part, pointless.34 Under conditions of
asymmetric information, formal commitments to recognize foreign judgments
do not yield optimal cooperation. The new rationale can thus explain why so few
such conventions and treaties exist, something not adequately explained by
previous theories. In particular, it can explain why the US is not a party to even
one such agreement.3"
Third, the reciprocity requirement-the decision of the forum to recognize
only foreign judgments rendered in countries that recognize the forum's
judgments-is also revealed as an empty constraint.36
Fourth, instead of adhering to a rule which always treats unrecognized
foreign judgments as devoid of any legal effect pending formal recognition,
unrecognized foreign judgments, in regard to which the forum would like to
induce cooperation with the foreign country, should sometimes be accorded a
certain legal effect.37 In other words, such unrecognized foreign judgments
should be considered by default as having the same effect as local judgments,
until a court of the forum rules otherwise. In order to moderately fit the forum's
recognition regime, I argue that lawmakers should consider forming an
exception to the rule always mandating a formal recognition process prior to
allowing any use of a foreign judgment. Indeed, sometimes it is necessary to
urgently use the foreign judgment-consider, for example, a scenario in which
recognition of a foreign judgment is sought, and certain provisional measures
against the foreign-judgment debtor to secure execution of the foreign judgment
are necessary-but the formal recognition process may take too long. In such a
case, adhering to the no-legal-effect rule, under which there is no legal status for
the foreign judgment until it is officially recognized, undermines efforts to
cooperate with the foreign country.
38
Section II of this Article discusses the incentives of countries to recognize
foreign judgments, introduces the asymmetric information problem, and
describes "selective" and "sporadic" recognition regimes. Section III explores
several of the legal implications of the asymmetric information view. A
conclusion follows.
34 See Section III.B.
35 See id.
36 See Section III.C.
37 See Section II1.D.
38 See id.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF SELECTIVE OR SPORADIC RECOGNITION
A. Recognition Incentives
The question of recognizing foreign judgments concerns a conflict-of-laws
issue that is separate from the two other classic conflict-of-laws issues-
jurisdiction and choice of law-which chronologically arise earlier (if at all) in
any given private dispute.39 Indeed, it is sufficient to understand the following
two basic facts. First, debtors can move their assets from one country to
another.40 They can often do so even after a lawsuit was brought against them.41
Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiff was capable of bringing a claim in Country
A, and of acquiring jurisdiction upon the defendant there, does not mean that
the plaintiff would not require beforehand that the judgment rendered by the
courts of Country A be recognized in Country B, as the defendant's assets were
transferred to that country. Second, one purpose for which recognition of
foreign judgments might be sought is the creation of a res judicata effect.42 A
party to a factual or legal claim of whom has been accepted in a judgment that
was rendered in Country A might still need to use that judgment in Country B in
order to create a preclusive effect and prevent the other party from re-litigating
the claim. Hence, assuming that each country can affect the extent to which
foreign judgments can be utilized in its territory,43 examining the incentives of
countries to recognize foreign judgments, as this Article has resolved to do, is
very much relevant.
Countries do have an interest in sometimes recognizing foreign judgments.
One reason mentioned earlier concerned the need to settle disputes in the
cheapest way possible.' Nonetheless, since private international law seeks to
regulate private disputes,4" considerations of justice between the disputed parties
39 See Peter Hay, Russell J. Weintraub, and Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials 1-
2 (Foundation 12th ed, 2004).
40 See, for example, Gryphon Domestic I/, LLC v APP International Finance Compary BTV, 41 AD3d 25,
31 (NYAD 2007) (court enjoining the debtors from transferring their assets to Indonesia); Elgin
Sweeper Co v Melson Inc, 884 F Supp 641, 645-46 (NDNY 1995) (creditor alleging that debtor
fraudulently conveyed assets to a third party in Canada).
41 Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 421 (cited in note 16) (rules prescribing the jurisdiction of courts
usually do not make the location of the defendant's assets a basis for jurisdiction and therefore
create "a substantial need" for foreign recognition).
42 See Hay, Weintraub, and Borchers, Conflict of Laws at 214 (cited in note 39).
43 See note 15.
44 See note 27.
45 See Johnston, 152 NE at 123 (cited in note 14).
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themselves might necessitate-from the forum's point of view-the recognition
of certain foreign judgments.46
Still, any country would prefer to choose, on a case-by-case basis, whether
or not to recognize any particular foreign judgment or refrain from doing so. 41
Free choice in this context would allow the forum to address its own needs first,
rather than those of a foreign country or of an external legal system. Consider an
example: suppose the forum is a country that does not acknowledge a right to
exclusivity in distributing products-a property-like entitlement that could be
enforced on third parties. Further, assume that a resident of the forum sells on
the internet a certain product to residents of a foreign country, the laws of which
respect such exclusivity rights. This appears to violate the entitlements of a
resident of that foreign country.48 Imagine that the forum resident is sued in the
foreign country. A foreign judgment, either enjoining the defendant from further
violating the rights of the plaintiff or requiring the defendant to compensate the
plaintiff, is rendered by a court of the foreign country.4 9 This foreign judgment is
then brought to the forum for recognition, in order to prevent the defendant-a
resident of the forum-from further infringing upon the rights of the plaintiff.
Non-recognition of this particular foreign judgment would allow the forum both
to protect its own resident and to preserve its policy regarding non-exclusivity in
distribution. Moreover, non-recognition of the foreign judgment in this example
could attract to the forum an incoming flow of businesses and capital, all of
which would come in search of the forum's protection.
Since the forum and the foreign country can each choose to recognize all
judgments or not, the best situation for the forum is that the foreign country is
obliged to recognize the forum's judgments, but that the forum is not similarly
obliged (although it may choose) to recognize that foreign country's judgments.
For the discussion that follows, imagine this provides a payoff of three to the
forum. Slightly worse for the forum is if both the foreign country and the forum
are obliged to recognize each other's foreign judgments. Assume this has a
payoff of two to the forum. Next, both the foreign country and the forum may
be under no obligation to recognize each other's foreign judgments. Consider
this to have a payoff of one to the forum. The worst case for the forum is where
the foreign country is not obliged to recognize the forum's judgments (although
46 See Recent Important Decisions, Judgment: Of Foreign Countr: Conclusiveness, 7 Mich L Rev 339, 350-51
(1908-09) (arguing that principles of right and justice rather than reciprocity should dictate the
effect of foreign judgments).
47 See notes 20-22.
48 See, for example, Abava (USA), Inc vJWG, Lid, 286 F Supp 2d 321, 323 (SDNY 2003).
49 See id at 322.
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it may choose to do so), but the forum is obliged to recognize the judgments of
the foreign country. Imagine this has a payoff of zero to the forum.
We can describe the interaction between a country's courts and a foreign
nation's legal system as a prisoner's dilemma using a typical payoff table:
Foslen C ounty Does Not Fomign C ountry
Coopeiate Coopeiates
F=0, PC=3 F=2, FC=2 Folum Coopeiates
Forum Does Not
F=1,FC=I F=3, FC=0 FooesataC oope~ab
Table 1: PayoffTable frrJudgm entRecognkbn Scenarbs
If Foreign Country decides not to cooperate, then Forum is better off
choosing not to cooperate as well. If Foreign Country decides to cooperate, then
Forum is still better off choosing not to cooperate. In other words, Forum's
strictly dominant strategy is to not cooperate. Foreign Country faces the same
payoff, and thus the result of the game is both countries choose not to
cooperate.
However, the countries will interact more than once; the interaction
repeats indefinitely, and thus the solution to this problem is a cooperative
equilibrium.5 0 Such equilibrium is manifested in a legal regime in which each
country is maintaining a formal legal arrangement for the recognition of foreign
judgments."1 Cooperation in this game is the result of rational behavior; the
game repeats itself, and each country fears the reaction of the other if the former
does not recognize foreign judgments of the latter. Thus, each country adopts a
cooperative strategy.
5 2
50 See note 23.
51 See note 25.
52 Some explain the prevalence of formal foreign judgments' recognition scheme with the tools of
psychology. Indeed, empirical research has shown that humans tend to react positively to a
behavior perceived to be positive, and negatively to a behavior perceived to be negative. Consider
Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Redprodi, 54 Games and Econ Beh 293 (2006); Dan
M. Kahan, The Logic of Redprotiy: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich L Rev 71 (2003)
(proposing that any particular individual's willingness to positively contribute to collective action
is determined by whether the particular individual perceives the other participants as contributing
to the collective action). Humans actually prefer cooperation. See James Andreoni and Larry
Samuelson, Building Rational Cooperation, 127 J Econ Theory 117, 145 (2006) (demonstrating that
people will, at times, choose cooperation despite economic incentives to the contrary).
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B. Selective/Sporadic Recognition
Contrary to prevailing perception, formal legal arrangements for the
recognition of foreign judgments cannot suffice to ensure cooperation between
countries. Indeed, the mere existence of a formal legal arrangement for the
recognition of foreign judgments cannot ensure the forum that its judgments
would be recognized by a foreign country-any foreign country for that
matter-with the same zealousness, diligence, and receptiveness with which the
forum would recognize the foreign judgments of that country. In fact, the
problem contemplated by each forum is not: "Does the foreign country, the
judgment of which I am asked to recognize, recognize my own judgments?"; but
rather: "To what extent does the foreign country, the judgment of which I am
asked to recognize, refrain-unjustifabyl, from m point of view--from recognizing
my judgments?"
Given the realities of the global marketplace, the forum does not have to
fear that a foreign country would systematicaly refrain from recognizing the
forum's judgments or formally legislate not to recognize the forum's judgments.
Such behavior would stigmatize the foreign country in the global market as a
non-cooperative country. Instead, the real fear that undermines cooperation
between countries concerns the possibility that the foreign country would
recognize the forum's judgments only £boradicaly or selecivey. "Sporadic
recognition" means that the choice of whether or not to recognize the forum's
judgments, from the forum's point of view, is relatively random without pure
policy backing. "Selective recognition" means that the foreign country, from the
forum's point of view, purposely chooses specific forum judgments to recognize
or not to recognize in harmony with its own policies. In other words, from the
forum's point of view, a selective/sporadic recognition regime is a regime less
cooperative than the one applied by the forum. It is a regime under which the
foreign country is not as receptive to the forum's judgments as the forum is
receptive to the foreign country's judgments.
Why does a foreign country adhere to a sporadic or selective recognition
regime? A sporadic recognition regime is the result of mere coincidence. A
sporadic recognition regime might ensue even without judges or legislators of
any particular country coordinating their moves. The constant fear of the forum
is that it is more zealous and more receptive to the foreign judgments of
Country A than Country A is towards the forum's judgments.5" Such a situation
53 See, for example, Russel J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need For a Judgments-Recognition
Convention and What Should We Boegain Away to Get It?, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L 167, 170 (1998) ("The
conventional wisdom driving the U.S. initiative for a judgments convention is that American
states freely recognize and enforce foreign judgments, but that other countries do not accord
reciprocal treatment to U.S. judgments.").
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could be caused by mere happenstance, without any deliberate, or concentrated,
attempt by the foreign country to do so. For example, a different set of values to
be associated by the foreign country with its public policy can work to drain the
set of potential judgments rendered by the forum that could be recognized by
the foreign country. Unfortunately, even if mere coincidence leads to less
receptiveness of the foreign country to judgments of the forum, the harmful
incentive driving the forum's reaction is nevertheless generated. Indeed, the
forum's fear falls back on the ranking of preferences mentioned before. 54 To be
direct, that ranking reveals that the forum strongly dislikes the possibility of
being the loser in the recognition game.
Sometimes, the recognition regime is not sporadic, but selective. A
selective recognition regime could be motivated by a specific agenda, such as the
desire of the foreign country to encourage defendants to transfer assets into that
country, increasing tax revenues. However, it is hard to find evidence of such an
agenda, and there are few ways for judges acting independently to make such a
concerted effort. And legislative guidance to that end is certainly nonexistent.
Still, the possibility that each judge at the forum carries with her, perhaps even
unconsciously, the specific agenda baton seems remote.
A general agenda driving selective recognition seems more plausible. A
general agenda is driven by each country's preference to have the foreign
country obliged to recognize its judgments, but not be obliged to recognize that
foreign country's judgments. Such a general agenda can spring into existence in a
number of ways. First, certain countries might develop rules regarding
recognition of foreign judgments that are simply stricter than the equivalent set
of rules applied by the foreign country. To the extent that the foreign country
cannot ascertain such an agenda, the forum would want its courts to develop a
more demanding set of rules than the one adopted by the foreign country.
Consider an example. Suppose a claim was filed in Country A against a
defendant from Country B, leading to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. When
the judgment is brought to Country B for execution, the debtor argues that
Country A has rendered its judgment without jurisdiction. In other words, the
debtor argues that the judgment ought not to be enforced in Country B, since
under the jurisdictional rules of Country B, Country A had no right to assume
jurisdiction in the first place and thus should not have considered itself
competent to litigate the dispute. The forum's general agenda (stricter
jurisdictional rules) leads to non-recognition of the foreign judgment.
A second source for a general agenda involves the way judges make
decisions. Any judge prefers an ex post "just" decision over an ex ante
54 See Section 11.A.
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commitment to recognize foreign judgments. A judge in a forum court will
refuse the recognition of a foreign judgment when recognition would infringe,
unjustifiably from the judge's point of view, upon the entitlements of the foreign
judgment debtor. As soon as a possible conflict arises between the need to
recognize a foreign judgment as part of an ex ante commitment by the forum
and the need to make an ex post fair decision-mind you, not necessarily in
favor of a local forum resident-the judge would prefer accomplishing ex post
justice. Indeed, this preference of the forum judge emanates from her
indifference to a situation in which a foreign judgment which should have been
recognized is not accorded any legal effect, in order to reach a more just result in
the specific case at hand.
Consider an example. Suppose a tort claim was filed in Country A against a
defendant from Country B, based on an injury in Country B. Imagine that the
defendant argues that Country A is an incompetent forum based on a treaty
executed between Country A and Country B, according to which tort claims
should always be filed at the place in which the harmful event occurred. The
judge in Country A may refuse the defendant's forum non conveniens argument
if she considers it more just to litigate thc dispute in Country A than in Country
B. For example, let us assume that as a result of the harm, the plaintiff is in need
of daily medical treatment, making it hard for the forum to force him to litigate
abroad, in Country B. Nevertheless, the judgment needs to be executed in
Country B, where the defendant holds her assets. Thus, one can expect that
Country B would decline to recognize the foreign judgment, to the extent that
pronouncing it is considered by Country B as unjustifiable and a violation of the
treaty between the two countries. Note that it does not matter whether or not
Country B is entitled to respond that way. The only important issue is that
Country B would now certainly prefer ex post justice towards the foreign
judgment debtor (resulting in non-recognition of the foreign judgment) over its
ex ante obligation to recognize judgments pronounced by Country A (if such an
obligation exists at all, as the claim was not filed in Country B, to begin with).
Indeed, in such a situation, despite the existence of a treaty, two things are
bound to happen. First, each country shall view its own decision as correct.
Country B will likely see Country A's decision as blatantly violating the treaty
between the two countries. Country A, however, will likely believe it cannot hold
to a position according to which its own courts were wrong-it simply is not
logical (by definition, the final legal result obtained following any litigation is,
from each country's viewpoint, the "correct" result; if it had not been "correct",
it would not have been the result). Second and consequently, Country B's
decision not to recognize the judgment rendered by Country A might cerainly be
perceived by Country A as being a defection from full cooperation.
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C. Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Problem of
Asymmetric Information
The problem of sporadic or selective recognition is a problem of
asymmetric information. To understand why, assume that the forum is
contemplating whether or not to recognize a foreign judgment and is interested
in knowing whether or not the foreign country is as receptive to the forum's
judgments as the forum is receptive to that foreign country's judgments. If the
forum could simply observe the formal legal arrangements prepared by the
foreign country for the recognition of foreign judgments, and decide accordingly
whether or not the foreign country is fully cooperating-no problem would
have ensued. In such a world, it would suffice for the forum to formally enact
legal arrangements for the recognition of foreign judgments, in order to induce
cooperation with the foreign country. The formal legal arrangement, coupled
with the repeating nature of the game, would induce the desired cooperation.
But the forum cannot identify or verify, merely by examining the foreign
country's formal legal regime, whether or not the foreign country, or any foreign
country for that matter, is applying a selective or sporadic recognition regime. In
order to ascertain whether the foreign country is as receptive to the forum's
judgments as the forum is receptive to foreign judgments of that country, the
forum needs to extensively oversee the manner in which the forum's judgments
are recognized by the foreign country. Written policies are not enough, as
unwritten policies may supplant them. However, countries are simply not
interested in making such an effort, as the necessary information is complex and
obtaining it is considerably costly."5
Sometimes it is impossible for the forum to decide whether the foreign
country is fully cooperating. Recall the example mentioned in the previous
Section. A tort claim that was litigated in Country A, seemingly in violation of a
treaty between Country A and Country B. Recall the sequence of events:
Country A decided to adjudicate the dispute and Country B decided not to
recognize the foreign judgment rendered by Country A because it seemingly
violated the treaty. Each country has reached its decision based on what might
be termed "ex post justice considerations." Indeed, each country chose to move
55 Consider the comparison to academic surveys: In 1988 Professor Friedrich Juenger conducted a
survey of the treatment of foreign judgments by various countries. Consider Friedrich K. J uenger,
The Recognition of Mony Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 Am J Comp L 1, 4 (1988). For
an extensive bibliography of sources examining the treatment of US judgments in foreign courts,
consider Robert E. Lutz, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Part II: A Selected Bibliography on Enforcement
of US Judgments in Foreign Countries, 27 Intl Lawyer 1029 (1993). Still, even such a wide scope survey
cannot supply the information necessary for the forum, as the survey depicts any legal regime in
general formal terms only.
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towards the result that it viewed as just rather than adhere to its "ex ante
obligation" under the treaty. But each country's preference for ex post justice
over its ex ante obligation generates an impenetrable smoke screen. Indeed, as
Country A does not acknowledge its own defection (Country A cannot admit
that its courts were wrong-it is not logical: from each country's viewpoint, final
judgments rendered by its courts are by definition "correct"), it cannot tell
whether or not Country B's reaction is a defection or not. One can thus
conclude that often ex post considerations of justice make it impossible for
countries to fully cooperate with regard to recognition of foreign judgments.
Sometimes it is possible for the forum to identify whether or not the
foreign country is fully cooperating with it, but it is relativey too costly to do so.
In such cases, a simple expert legal opinion produced by someone proficient in
the law of the foreign country cannot reveal the necessary information. Such
opinions do not, and cannot, address each and every case that was ever litigated
by the courts of the foreign country. And even if the expert opinion did cover all
known cases, it would still not suffice. Consider the reasons.
First, in order to ascertain whether the foreign country is as receptive to
the forum's judgments as the forum is receptive to foreign judgments of the
foreign country, the forum needs to consider information about yp othetical cases.
Indeed, at any given moment, there is no guarantee that each case litigated at the
forum has an identical equivalent that was already litigated at the foreign
country. Thus, the forum needs to concern itself with questions such as "what
would happen if. . ." regarding the law of foreign judgments of the foreign
country, or regarding the law of foreign judgments of the forum. Obviously, it is
an analysis that is very difficult to accomplish. If it were not difficult, law schools
would probably cease to exist. In each and every course in law school students
and law professors are actually trying to "guess" what the law is (based upon an
understanding of the rationales driving the law, as such rationales are derived
from existing case law). Imagine the forum having to do so-guess what the law
is in a hypothetical case-with regard to foreign law.
Second, in order to ascertain receptiveness, the forum needs to examine
not only the judicial decisions rendered in cases in which recognition of
particular foreign judgments was discussed, but also the context and perhaps the
hidden agenda behind these decisions. It is well known that judges do not always
expose the true agenda that drove them to reach the decision. Thus, the effort to
ascertain the foreign country's receptiveness is to a large extent a subjective
endeavor. If a foreign country denies a judgment of the forum, the forum must
decide if it is a defection, a one-time exception, or a new policy. Again, this is
very difficult to discern.
Third, the forum needs to oversee the manner in which the foreign
country's judgments are recognized by the forum itself. Recall, that the forum is
interested in a quid pro quo bargain. The forum only cares about the relative
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receptiveness of the foreign country to its own judgments. Thus, what is
required here is a comparative systematic analysis-both factual and legal-of
each case in which the recognition of the forum's judgments was sought at the
foreign country or the recognition of the foreign country's judgments was
sought at the forum. Such an analysis needs to analytically compare similar and
different cases that ran through the systems of both the forum and the foreign
country.
There seems to be no one poised to conduct these inquiries. Governments
are unlikely to allocate the large amount of required public resources needed to
explore all cases heard in all foreign countries. The recognition of foreign
judgments thus becomes a private matter, which concerns the two litigating
parties. Governments generally do not perceive these as questions of
international relationships. Due to the limited resources allocated to resolve
private disputes, one cannot expect the government to sponsor the effort to
ascertain the foreign country's relative cooperation with the forum.
Private parties are also unlikely to provide this information. Even if the
necessary information concerns only one foreign country, a private party often
does not have the required resources to conduct such a comprehensive inquiry.
Moreover, a private party is driven by a sub-optimal incentive to invest in
obtaining such information, as such information also benefits others, who are
not participating in financing its discovery.
Even if private parties have the resources to do such research, they will
present only a partial picture that bolsters their own argument. If asked to
describe whether or not the foreign country is as receptive to the forum's
judgments as the latter is receptive to foreign judgments of the former, a private
party would supply an answer that promotes his own interest, and would back it
up with partial evidence. Resorting to an adversarial solution, which would
confront each party's evidence with that of the other, will obviously carry with it
duplicative, and thus wasteful, efforts.
In sum, the relative cooperativeness of the foreign country-its
receptiveness to the forum's judgments-is a data point that is expensive for the
forum to identify, thus creating a problem of private information, which severely
burdens any attempt by the two countries to cooperate.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The new economic rationale presented in the previous section generates
several legal arguments, both positive and normative. This section shall explore a
number of them.
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A. Recognition or Registration?
To a large extent, accepting foreign judgments into the local legal system
can be accomplished in two different ways: one is "recognition" of the foreign
judgment and the other is "registration" of that judgment. The difference
between these two methods turns on whether the foreign-judgment creditor,
seeking the foreign judgment to be formally accepted by the forum, has the
burden of proving certain preconditions prior to the foreign judgment being
eligible for local use. Registration is of an administrative nature, and in its pure
form hardly imposes any such burden upon the foreign-judgment creditor, who
only needs, in the context in which she seeks the foreign judgment to create a
legal effect, to comply with technical (and relatively cheap) requirements, such as
introducing an authenticated copy of the foreign judgment56 and producing a
sworn statement.5 7 In contrast, recognition involves a process of judicial review,
and mandates that the foreign-judgment creditor bring an action on the foreign
judgment, and meet the burden of proving such preconditions as competence of
the foreign court to have issued the judgment and jurisdiction of the local court
required to recognize the foreign judgment.
Note, however, that the foreign-judgment debtor can vacate either the
recognition of the foreign judgment or its registration. Still, defeating the foreign
judgment in the registration track requires the foreign-judgment debtor to argue
and prove one of the grounds for non-recognition, while in the recognition track
the foreign-judgment debtor may also enjoy non-recognition simply because the
foreign-judgment creditor failed to carry the burden to prove the prerequisites
for recognition.
Except in a few states, 8 US law currently does not entertain registration,5 9
and only allows recognition of foreign country judgments.6" Thus, foreign-
56 See, for example, 28 USC § 1963 (registration in any federal district court of a judgment rendered
in any other district); 28 USC § 2508 (registration in any district court of a judgment entered in
the US Court of Federal Claims in favor of the US). See also Hay, Conflict of Laws at 229-30 (cited
in note 39).
57 See, for example, ALI Proposal, § 10(b)-(c).
58 For example, Florida and Hawaii have integrated a registration track in their versions of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962. See Fla Stat Ann § 55.604 (West
2009); Hawaii Rev Stat § 658C-4 (2009). However, Hawaii has recently repealed its registration
track. See 2009 Haw Sess Laws, Act 34, § 2, effective April 30, 2009. In Texas, acceptance of a
foreign judgment can be accomplished via a single procedural step, in accordance with the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act of 1962. See Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd v Patal
Enterprises, Lid, 794 SW2d 760, 761 (Tex 1990). In Illinois, the existence of an administrative-like
recognition track is unclear. Compare Society of Loyd's v Ashenden, 233 F3d 473, 475-76 (7th Cir
2000) (foreign-judgment creditor filed the foreign judgment in a district court and then issued
"citations" pursuant to the Illinois procedure for executing a judgment) with Bianchi v Savino De
Bene Intl Freight Forwarders, Inc, 770 NE2d 684, 684 (IlI 2003) (foreign-judgment creditor filed the
Vol. 10 No. 2
The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition
judgment creditors often hold the burden of proof regarding several matters,
including the jurisdiction of the foreign court to issue the judgment.61 Fighting
this burden of proof may be costly. For example, establishing the foreign court's
competence to deliver the judgment may necessitate a legal opinion on the
foreign law. 62
Should lawmakers prefer recognition or registration? The American Law
Institute's recent initiative calls for adopting registration as a method for
accepting into the local legal system certain foreign judgments. The particular
judgments involved are money judgments not subject to appeal issued by courts
of countries that have entered into an agreement with the US for reciprocal
recognition of judgments and which were not rendered by default or upon
confession. 63 The new rationale introduced in this Article can solve the problem,
as it requires that for purposes of cooperation with a foreign country registration
be preferred.
Consider the economic explanation. Since the problem that threatens
cooperation among countries is a problem of asymmetric information,64 one
foreign judgment and initiated both citation proceedings and a complaint to recognize the foreign
judgment pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act).
59 See Renoir v Redstar Corp, 20 Cal Rptr 3d 603, 607-08 (Cal App 2004) (finding that California had
explicitly excluded foreign judgments from its adoption of a mere registration requirement); Begen
Industries and Fishing Corp v Joint Stock Holding Co, 2002 WL 1587179 (WD Wash 2002);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 481 cmt g (1987) (cited in note 9). Note,
however, that registration is the method for according full faith and credit to sister state
judgments and federal judgments.
60 For example, an action to enforce a foreign judgment is a separate civil action imposing its own
jurisdictional requirements. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 481 cmt g (1987)
(cited in note 9). The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act allows an expedited
procedure such as summary judgment to enforce a foreign money judgment, but also places a
certain burden of proof upon the judgment creditor. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act of 1962, § 3 (cited in note 10) (stating that a foreign money judgment is
enforceable in the same manner as "judgment[s] of a sister state which [are] entitled to full faith
and credit").
61 See, for example, Farrow Mortgage Services Py Ltd v Singh, 3 Mass L Rptr 552 (Mass 1995) (finding
that the plaintiff sustained the burden of proving personal jurisdiction in the Australian court
which rendered the foreign judgment).
62 See, for example, Mayekawa Mfg Co v Sasaki, 888 P2d 183, 185-86, 188-89 (Wash App 1995)
(involving a foreign-judgment creditor that submitted an expert opinion on Japanese law).
63 See ALI Proposal, §§ 7(c), 10(a), (b)(ii), (c)(2). According to the ALI Proposal, while the
recognition track places the burden of proof with regard to most issues on the foreign judgment
debtor, the registration track is a simpler procedure. It is modeled on the procedure provided for
registration in federal courts of judgments of other federal courts pursuant to 28 USC § 1963 and
on the registration procedure of judgments of state and federal courts in another state court. See
ALI proposal, §§ 9 (a) & cmt, 10(a)-(c) & cmts.
64 See Section II.C.
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solution would be for the forum to signal its willingness to cooperate with the
foreign country.6" The forum can do so by deciding that judgments of a certain
type and from specific countries with which the forum would like to induce
cooperation will be registered rather than simply recognized. Such a foreign
judgment could be subjected, of course, to the usual defenses that apply to
foreign judgments. This is not to say that unrecognized foreign judgments
should be treated as local judgments altogether. Rather, the burden of proof-
with regard to the local validity of a foreign judgment rendered in a country with
which the forum would like to establish cooperation-should shift from the
foreign-judgment creditor to the foreign-judgment debtor (the former being
interested in the forum accepting the foreign judgment, the latter being
interested in non-acceptance).
Deciding in advance which countries will have their judgments enjoy in the
forum an ad-hoc status of a local judgment-pending proof to the contrary by
the foreign-judgment debtor-serves as a signal to those countries. First, it is an
observable gesture by the forum. The forum only needs to publish a list of
judgments, according to the judgment's type and country of origin, which will be
accorded the ad-hoc legal effect of any other local judgment. The forum can
therefore choose to cooperate with countries with regard to only specific types
of judgments, meaning that the forum is not forced to make a strictly binary
choice between cooperation and non-cooperation with any single foreign
country. For example, the forum can choose to cooperate with the foreign
country with regard to money judgments only, but not with regard to judgments
that concern personal status.
Second, the signal sent by the forum is costly enough to create a separating
equilibrium.66 The signal is costly because it threatens the forum with having to
accord legal effect to judgments that the forum would not have recognized
otherwise, for instance, if the foreign judgment would enter an orderly process
of recognition prior to being accorded any legal effect. Thus, any attempt by the
forum to behave selectively towards foreign judgments-a behavior which, as
already explained, the foreign country dreads-is undermined by the ad-hoc
status of a local judgment which is accorded to the foreign judgment. In other
words, the signal sent by the forum is convincing because it takes away from the
65 Consider Michael A. Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355 (1973) (developing a signaling
equilibrium game within the context of asymmetrical information problems in job markets, and
proposing that the underlying framework can explain other market phenomena).
66 In a signaling model a separating equilibrium is formed as each type of informed agent chooses a
different action and the informed agent is thus able to convey its type to the uninformed agent. In
contrast, in a pooling equilibrium, both types of the informed agent choose the same action, and
thus no information is conveyed to the uninformed agent. See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green,
Microeconomic Theory at 450-57 (cited in note 28).
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forum, at least to some extent, the ability to decide which foreign judgments
shall be recognized and which shall not. Under a registration regime the forum
faces the risk that any certain judgment would be accepted into the forum even
though that judgment, from the forum's viewpoint, should not be recognized.
The cost imposed upon the forum by this signal is too high to be borne by non-
cooperating forums, that is, by forums interested in a selective recognition
regime. Indeed, if a forum would like to adhere to a selective recognition regime,
it cannot allow mere happenstance to regulate which foreign judgments are
accorded legal effect and which are not. The foreign country understands the
risk to which the forum exposes itself, and can now distinguish between a
cooperating forum and one which is not cooperating.
There are three specific determinants of the cost of this signal to the
forum. The first situation in which the signal sent by the forum becomes an
actual burden on the forum is a situation in which the foreign-judgment debtor
does not raise any defense argument against the foreign judgment. Consider, for
example, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court. If the
foreign-judgment debtor does not raise a defense that she could raise, the
foreign-judgment continues to maintain, following its registration, its local legal
effect; despite the fact that it is not a judgment. Note that several of the defenses
to be raised are certainly costly, as they must be backed up with expensive
evidence, usually an expert legal opinion on the foreign law.
The second situation is one in which the judgment debtor does raise a
defense argument, but fails to prove it. Again, a foreign judgment that should
not have been accepted into the local legal system, maintains its status as a
registered judgment, and generates a legal effect within the local legal system.
The third situation is one in which the foreign-judgment debtor raises a
defense argument against the foreign judgment, but judicial error causes the
argument to be denied.
In each of these three situations, the forum finds itself recognizing and
according legal effect to foreign judgments that it otherwise would not have
been recognized. The final result of recognition or non-recognition is beyond
the forum's control. Indeed, the end result depends upon other variables such as
the cost for the foreign judgment debtor to defend against the judgment, the
extent to which judicial errors occur, etcetera.
The signal described here can be improved. The forum can change its rules
of evidence or require a higher standard of proof in order to establish a defense
against a foreign judgment that was accorded an ad-hoc status of a local
judgment. Requiring more evidence or a higher standard of proof in order to
attack a foreign judgment which was accorded an ad-hoc status of a local
judgment makes challenging more expensive and thus increases the risk faced by
the forum that unwarranted foreign judgments will become operative. Any effort
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exerted by the forum to behave selectively in recognizing foreign judgments is
also curtailed.
B. Inter-Country Recognition Agreements
The pursuit of recognition agreements seems to be considered by various
countries as productive."s However, few recognition agreements have thus far
been executed by countries. The US is not a party to any such agreement;68 and
several attempts to form such agreements to which the US would be a party
have failed.69 Those countries that are party to such agreements are generally
parties to only a few. ° A small number of multilateral recognition agreements
exist worldwide: two in the EU,7' the Inter-American Convention on
Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of
Foreign Judgments,2 and three conventions for the recovery abroad of
maintenance.7 3 A recent famous attempt to produce a multilateral recognition
agreement, by the Hague Convention on Private International Law-in which
the US participated-has also failed. 4
67 See, for example, Weintraub, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L at 167 (cited in note 53).
68 See Brian R. Paige, Comment, Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts: A Comparative
Analysis, 26 Seattle U L Rev 591, 621-22 (2003).
69 For example, negotiations for a convention with the UK in the mid-1970s ultimately failed in
1981. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Introductory Note to Foreign
Judgments and Awards, n 1; Peter Hay and Robert J. Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments
Convention Between the United States and the United ingdom, 11 Texas Intl L J 421 (1976); Paige, 26
Seattle U L Rev at 622 (cited in note 68).
70 Some countries, such as the UK, Australia, and Canada, adopt a registration track for foreign-
judgments coming from countries which are considered to be reciprocating countries; but not
each country the judgments of which are eligible for registration in these fora is a party to a
respective agreement with the forum. Australia, for example, considers thirty-six countries to be
reciprocating countries, but does not have an agreement with all of them.
71 Council Regulation 44/2001, OJ 2001 (L 12) 1 ("Brussels I"); and Council Regulation 1347/2000,
OJ 2000 (L 160) 19 ("Brussels 11"). See also Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come? The
Need for a Mulilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Moneta7 Judgments, 26 L &
Policy Intl Bus 79, 91-92 (1994).
72 Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial
Validity of Foreign Judgments, 24 ILM 468 (1985).
73 1956 UN Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, the 1958 Hague Convention
Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Maintenance Toward
Children, and the 1973 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relative to Maintenance Obligations. See David F. Cavers, International Enforcement of Family
Support, 81 Colum L Rev 994, 996, 999 & n 24, 1000-13 (1981).
74 See Scoles et al, Conflict of Laws at 1324 (cited in note 2); Paige, 26 Seattle U L Rev at 623 (cited in
note 68); Ralf Michaels, Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Concetions as Applied in Judgment Conventions,
in Eckart Gottschalk, et al, eds, Conflict of Laws in a GlobaliZed World 29, 29-31 (2007).
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Indeed, as far as recognition of most foreign judgments is concerned, many
countries around the world appear to be relying solely upon unilateral legal
arrangements, meaning they decide on their own.
While there has been little success in executing recognition agreements, the
situation is quite different in other contexts. Indeed, in the context of judgments
rendered and recognized within the EU, or even in the context of foreign
arbitral awards, countries do cooperate by joining multilateral conventions.
Examples of such conventions include the Brussels I and II Regulations
applying to EU countries, and the New York Convention, which applies to
foreign arbitral awards"5 and is considered a fairly successful multilateral
convention.76
This brings the obvious question: What is the explanation for the fact that
the US is not a party to any agreement with a foreign country regarding the
recognition of foreign judgments? How is it possible that there is a treaty for the
recognition of foreign judgments between EU countries, while such treaties are
usually hard to find elsewhere? What is the difference between recognition of
foreign judgments and recognition of foreign arbitral awards?
Conventional wisdom-at least with regard to the case of the US-usually
points to the difference in domestic laws as a possible reason. 7 The punitive,
multiple, and excessive damages awarded by US coarts are disliked by several
countries.78 Thus, it is argued, cooperation in the design of recognition
agreements between these countries and the US is undermined by the need to
agree on the appropriate treatment of US judgments in these countries.
75 Arbitral awards are decisions rendered by foreign private arbitrators to end disputes brought
before them by parties who are bound to an arbitration agreement.
76 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York
1959, 330 UN Treaty Ser 38. As of now, the New York Convention has 142 signatories. See also
Martin L. Roth, Recognition by Circumvention: Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards as Judgments Under the
Parallel Entitlements Approach, 92 Cornell L Rev 573, 575-77 (2007); Lawrence S. Schaner and John
R. Schleppenbach, Looking Back at 2007: Another Good Year for the Enforcement of InternalionalArbitral
Awards in the US, 63 Disp Resol J 80, 80 (2008) ("In 2007, the parties challenging enforcement
were remarkably unsuccessful. US district courts confirmed international arbitration awards
almost across the board.').
77 See Hay, Conflict of Laws at 221-22 (cited in note 39); Scoles et al, Conflict of Laws at 1269-70 (cited
in note 2).
78 See, for example, Lewis v Eliades [2004] 1 WLR 692, 41, 47-49 (UK); Peter Hay, The Recognition
and Enforcement of American Mongy-Judgments In Germany, 40 Am J Comp L 729, 746-47 (1992)
(describing the German approach); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24
Brooklyn J Intl L 111, 113 (1998) (describing the British approach); Weintraub, 24 Brooklyn J Intl
L at 181-82 (cited in note 53) (describing the German approach). But see Scott R. Jablonski,
Enforcing US Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts: A Recent Case in the Supreme Court of Spain, 24
J L & Comm 225, 227-30 (2005) (describing a Spanish decision to enforce an American judgment
in its entirety even though the plaintiff won punitive damages as part of its award).
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The asymmetric information problem discussed in this Article offers
another explanation and a consequent recommendation for lawmakers. To be
sure, the new theory can supply an explanation, which concerns the fact that the
New York and EU Conventions actually operate, even if unconsciously, to
confront the problem of asymmetric information. Entering mutual recognition
agreements does not guarantee the forum that its preferences regarding mutual
judgment recognition will be met. Because of the problem of asymmetric
information, even with regard to a country with which the forum has a formal
recognition agreement, the forum still has to be troubled by the possibility that
the foreign country is less receptive to the forum's judgments than the forum is
to the foreign country's judgments. This can occur either as a selective
recognition regime or a sporadic recognition regime. Of course, the main theme
concerns the forum's inability to identify whether or not the foreign country is
applying a less receptive recognition regime.
The normative recommendation for lawmakers is therefore clear. Instead
of putting an emphasis on drafting and concluding recognition agreements per
se, lawmakers interested in optimal cooperation need to shift attention to the
problem of asymmetric information. Lawmakers need to resort to unilateral
moves that could strengthen the level of mutual cooperation with regard to
foreign judgments, taking into account the problem of asymmetric information
described here.79
Alternatively, lawmakers need to focus upon recognition agreements that
adhere to this problem by carefully following the paradigm of conventions such
as the Brussels I and II or the New York Convention. Understanding how the
signaling solution offered in the previous section works can help explain the
relative success of recognition regimes such as those applied with regard to EU
countries' judgments within any other EU country, under the Brussels
Convention, or with regard to foreign arbitral awards under the New York
Convention. Indeed, both the Brussels Conventions and New York Convention
shift the burden of proof with regard to any preconditions or defenses against
the foreign judgment (or arbitral award) to the foreign-judgment debtor."0 Thus,
79 For an example of such a move, see Section III.A.
80 See Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States and Europe:
How Can We Achieve a Comprehensive Trea y?, 23 Rev Litig 381, 390 (2004), citing Lee S. Bartlett, Full
Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Convention ofJuisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 Intl & Comp L Q 44, 59-60 (1975)
(discussing how the Brussels Convention has created within the European Community an
essentially federal system of recognition of judgments that has been likened to the "full faith and
credit" afforded sister-state judgments within the US); Schaner and Schleppenbach, 63 Dispute
Resolution J at 82 (cited in note 76) ("The New York Convention, which is celebrating its 50th
anniversary, liberalized the procedures for enforcing foreign arbitration awards by shifting the
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even if inadvertently, lawmakers have devised signaling solutions that may help
overcome the problem of sporadic or selective recognition.
C. Should Reciprocity be a Formal Requirement?
The pursuit of recognition agreements is sometimes accomplished ex post
via the reciprocity requirement. 81 Indeed, reciprocity is in fact an examination
initiated by the forum of whether the foreign country is actually enforcing an
implicit, silent, agreement between the foreign country and the forum to
recognize each other's judgments. To be sure, the reciprocity requirement
explores whether or not the foreign country that rendered the foreign judgment
that is currently up for recognition by the forum, actually recognizes judgments
pronounced by the forum. When reciprocity is established, it means that
although a formal recognition agreement has not been executed between the two
countries, it is actually unnecessary, as all parties know and understand the terms
to which they should submit. The problem, as discussed above, is how to verify
and react to defection or breach of this implicit agreement. Reciprocity,
continues the argument, serves as the retaliatory framework. It creates an
incentive for foreign countries to adopt recognition of the forum's judgments as
a strategy.
82
US law is divided over the necessity of the reciprocity requirement. While
most states have rejected the reciprocity requirement," seven have authorized,
but have not mandated, their courts to deny recognition on the grounds of lack
of reciprocity.8 4 Two states have made reciprocity a mandatory prerequisite to
recognition.8" Furthermore, a recent initiative by the American Law Institute
advocates the reestablishment of lack of reciprocity as a non-discretionary
burden of proof to the party opposing enforcement and expressly limiting the available defenses
to enforcement.").
s1 See Whincop, 23 Mel U L Rev at 424 (cited in note 16) (describing reciprocity as a threat that
enshrines a tit-for-tat strategy).
82 See Richard W. Hulbert, Some Thoughts on Judgments, Recnrody, and the Seeming Paradox of International
CommercialArbitration, 29 U PaJ Intl L 641, 645 (2008).
83 For a detailed description of the relevant legal history, see id at 643-44; Vishali Singal, Preserving
Power Without SactifiingJustice: Creating an Effective Redprody Regime for the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, 59 Hastings L J 943, 947-54 (2008).
84 These are Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, Maine, and Texas; and New York and California, when
the defendant is a US Citizen.
85 These are Georgia and Massachusetts. Colorado requires in its version of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, an agreement with the foreign country on reciprocity, and
therefore does not enforce foreign judgments in accordance with the Uniform Act. However,
Colorado recognizes and enforces foreign judgments under the common law doctrine of comity.
See Milhoux v Linder, 902 P2d 856, 860 (Colo App 1995).
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defense against recognition of a foreign judgment.86 The declared purpose of
such a move is "not to make it more difficult to secure recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather to create an incentive to foreign
countries to commit to recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in
the United States.""7 According to the proposed amendment, foreign judgments
will not be enforced if the court finds that comparable judgments of courts in
the US would not be recognized or enforced in the courts of the state of origin.
The foreign-judgment debtor, in order to avoid recognition of the foreign-
judgment against him, carries the burden of proof; he needs to prove that there
is "substantial doubt that the courts of the state of origin would grant
recognition or enforcement to comparable judgments of courts in the United
States."88 To do this, the debtor may rely upon expert testimony, or judicial
notice "if the law of the state of origin or decisions of its courts are clear" to
satisfy this burden of proof.89 However, the court must conduct an inquiry
concerning comparable judgments and needs to address a long list of factors.90
According to the American Law Institute proposal, denial by courts of the
foreign country of recognition of judgments for punitive, exemplary, or multiple
damages is not to be regarded as denial of reciprocal recognition as long as the
foreign country recognizes the compensatory portion of such judgments.91
Finally, lack of reciprocity cannot serve as a defense if the Secretary of State has
negotiated an agreement with the foreign country on reciprocal practices.
92
The new theory presented here can help solve the dispute between
advocates of the reciprocity defense and those who advocate abandoning
reciprocity as a requirement. The economic rationale presented in this Article,
which focuses on understanding a problem of asymmetric information, brings
about the conclusion that reciprocity is irrelevant at best and misleading at
worst. Indeed, because of the problem of asymmetric information, the forum
cannot ascertain whether or not the foreign country, a judgment of which it is
considering for recognition, is applying a selective or sporadic recognition
regime with regard to judgments rendered by the forum. In other words, the
forum cannot ascertain in any given moment, whether or not that foreign
country is actually less receptive to the forum's judgments then the forum is to
86 ALI Proposal, § 7(a)-(b) (cited in note 9). See also Hulbert, 29 U Pa J Intl L at 646 (cited in note
82).
87 ALl Proposal § 7 cmt (b).
88 Id § 7(b).
89 Id.
90 Id § 7(c).
91 ALl Proposal § 7(d).
92 Id § 7(e).
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that country's judgments, and whether or not the foreign country has taken such
an uncooperative position intentionally or unintentionally. The reciprocity
defense can only accurately block those cases in which the foreign country
refrains altogether from recognizing the forum's judgments-a rare
occurrence.93 In all other cases, proving the reciprocity defense can be
accomplished only by anecdotal evidence that does not necessarily reflect the
foreign country's actual recognition regime. It thus also makes no difference
who carries the burden of proof-the judgment creditor or the judgment
debtor.
It comes as no surprise, then, that it has been recently suggested that the
reciprocity requirement should only be considered as satisfied if the foreign
country has entered a formal recognition agreement with the forum.94 This
suggestion actually admits to the fact that ex post recognition agreements-via
the reciprocity requirement-are futile; and that only ex ante agreements ought
to be considered. Of course, the previous section has explained the futility of
making formal inter-country recognition agreements.
95
D. The Legal Effect of Unrecognized Foreign Judgments
What is the legal effect of an unrecognized foreign judgment or a foreign
judgment that has not been recognized or registered yet? This question differs
from the recognition/registration selection contemplated in a previous section.
9 6
The recognition/registration choice did not undermine any of the foreign-
judgment debtor's defenses, as she could halt the process of utilizing the foreign
judgment, even if that foreign judgment was registered, and force the
adjudication of the defense. The legal effect of unrecognized foreign judgments
concerns a situation in which the foreign judgment must be put to an immediate
practical use, although a possible defense is raised by the judgment debtor,
which has not been adjudicated yet. In other words, the foreign-judgment
creditor needs the foreign judgment to be used instantaneously, even before
courts of the forum can have a chance to decide whether the challenged foreign
judgment at hand qualifies for recognition (or registration).
Many common law jurisdictions have a simple answer for this question:
Unrecognized foreign judgments have no local legal effect whatsoever. 97 In
93 One country which used to come close to applying such a unique regime is the People's Republic
of China. See note 15 for a list of authorities.
94 See Singal, 59 Hastings L J at 969-70 (cited in note 83).
95 See Section IlI.B.
96 See Section III.A.
97 See note 4. See also Peter Barnett, ResJudicata, Estoppel, and Foreign Judgments, 25, 32 (Oxford 2001)
(describing UK law).
Winter 2010
Rotem
Chicago Journal of Internalional Law
these countries, a foreign judgment is meaningless prior to being formally
recognized by the courts or the government. A formal process of recognition is
needed, in which certain preconditions for recognition, or registration, must be
met. 98
Conventional wisdom derives the legal effect of an unrecognized foreign
judgment from a territorial rationale. Such an explanation considers any act
rendered by a foreign sovereign, foreign judgments included, as having no legal
operation within the territorial borders of the forum. 99 Indeed, such an act is
considered to have binding legal effect only within the territorial borders of the
country issuing it. The territorial rationale is founded upon the understanding
that the forum cannot trust any foreign judgment in the same manner in which it
trusts local judgments. The foreign judgment might have been issued at the
foreign country as a result of a legal proceeding that violated the rules of natural
justice, it might have been issued by an incompetent court, or the judgment
might be in contravention of the forum's public policy. Moreover, a no-legal-
effect rule gives the forum a tool that allows it to examine whether or not a
specific foreign country is cooperating with it before the forum decides to
reciprocate.' 00 Each foreign judgment is regarded has having no local legal effect,
and a formal process of recognition, during which the foreign country's
cooperation is examined, is necessary.
An exception to this no-legal-effect rule exists in countries that allow
foreign-judgment creditors to use the unrecognized foreign judgment in order to
obtain provisional relief against the foreign-judgment debtor, pending a
thorough judicial examination of the foreign-judgment recognition question.'
This is relatively common. Nevertheless, the question of unrecognized foreign
judgments can arise in other contexts as well, in which the legal effect of such
foreign judgments is less clear. In these contexts the asymmetric information
explanation offered in this Article can help determine the appropriate legal
regime.
Consider, for example, a need to utilize an unrecognized foreign judgment
in order to impose an immediate automatic stay upon creditors' attempts to
collect their debt through all means of collection possible. Suppose a Canadian
company in bankruptcy is facing a lawsuit in the Eastern District of New
98 See note 9.
99 See note 4.
100 See Whincop, 23 Melb U L Rev at 424 (cited in note 16).
101 Consider ALI Proposal § 12 (provisional measures in aid of foreign proceedings); Littleton v Moss,
914 S2d 51 (La App 2005) (finding that a writ of attachment in aid of a sister state judgment with
regard to which an exception is still pending was enforceable).
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York.'0 2 While a US bankruptcy filing would have imposed an automatic stay on
the estate, preventing the corporation's debtors from engaging in any collection
efforts in the US,'0 3 such a stay is not automatic when the bankruptcy procedure
is initiated abroad. The Bankruptcy Code does deal with international filings, in
Chapter 15.104 According to the Bankruptcy Code, this chapter aims "to provide
effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency."' '
Relief under Chapter 15 "is available only after a foreign representative
commences an ancillary proceeding for recognition of a foreign proceeding
before a bankruptcy court."'0 6 Absent such recognition, or at least a petition for
such recognition,"i courts have no authority to consider requests for a stay."'
To the extent that obtaining recognition, or filing a petition for recognition, does
not impose a heavy burden upon the petitioner, 109 the forum is actually allowing
the practical use of an unrecognized foreign judgment. As will immediately be
explained, the new rationale offered in the Article justifies such a regime.
Consider a second example, which (for practical reasons) is less important
in the American context but is nevertheless relevant in other jurisdictions. The
typical scenario concerns a situation in which the foreign-judgment creditor
needs to use an unrecognized foreign judgment to initiate an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding at the forum against the foreign-judgment debtor."0
102 See United States vJA. Jones Construction Group, LLC, 333 BR 637, 638-639 (EDNY 2005) (without
commencing an ancillary proceeding before an American bankruptcy court for the recognition of
a Canadian bankruptcy proceeding, a Canadian interim receiver for a parent company that was
put in bankruptcy proceedings in Canada sought a stay of an action filed in the US against the
Canadian company's subsidiary. The District Court held that it had no authority to consider this
request, but agreed to stay the action for 60 days so that the receiver could seek appropriate
relief).
103 11 USC § 362.
104 11 USC §5 1501-1532.
105 11 USC § 1501(a).
106 Jones, 333 BR at 638.
107 See 11 USC 5 1519 (relief that may be granted upon filing petition for recognition).
108 Jones, 333 BR at 639. See also Justin Luna, Thinking Globally, Filing Locally: The Effects of the New
Chapter 15 on Business Entioy Cross-Border Insolveny Cases, 19 FlaJ Ind L 671, 689-92 (2007).
109 See 11 USC § 1515(b) ("A petition for recognition shall be accompanied by (1) a certified copy of
the decision commencing such foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative; (2) a
certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of such foreign proceeding and of the
appointment of the foreign representative; or (3) in the absence of evidence referred to in
paragraphs (1) and (2), any other evidence acceptable to the court of the existence of such foreign
proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign representative.").
110 An involuntary bankruptcy case can be commenced "by three or more entities, each of which is
either a holder of a claim against such person that is not configent as to liabilioy or the subject of a bonafide
dispute as to liabiliy or amount." 11 USC 5 303(b)(1) (emphasis added). The petitioning creditors in
an involuntary bankruptcy bear the burden of proving one of the statutory grounds for
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Suppose the involuntary proceeding is required as it is the only way in which the
foreign-judgment creditor can retrieve into the estate assets that have been
fraudulently removed, or assets that were transferred to certain creditors in an
unlawful preference. An involuntary bankruptcy often seeks to recover debts, as
certain doctrines can only be evoked once a formal bankruptcy procedure
commences: creation of the bankruptcy estate, which comprises the debtor's
property at the time of filing;... imposition of the automatic stay, which prevents
other creditors from taking collection actions against the debtor, in a manner
that reduces the value remaining for the foreign-judgment creditor;" 2 or the
trustee's avoiding powers, which enable to avoid preferential or fraudulent
dispositions of the debtor's property." 3 Indeed, it is possible that even standard
intermediate provisional measures, such as attachment of the debtor's assets,
cannot suffice, and that the only way in which the foreign-judgment creditor
could recover the debt is through an involuntary bankruptcy initiated against the
foreign-judgment debtor. 1 4 But consider what happens if the existence of a debt
which qualifies its holder as a petitioning creditor-a prerequisite for
commencing the procedure, that "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount
. .. 11 USC § 303(h)(1). The Bankruptcy Code does not define "contingent" or "bona fide
dispute." A contingent claim is one that is conditional on a future uncertain event. The debtor is
potentially liable because of a contract or a tortious act, but will only become liable if a future
uncertain event occurs. See Brian A. Blum, Bankrupty and Debtor/Creditor: Examples and
Explanations 210 (Aspen 4th ed 2006). A tort claim not yet reduced to a judgment is contingent.
See In re All Media Properties, Inc, 5 BR 126, 133 (Bankr SD Tex 1980), affd 646 F2d 193 (5th Cir
1986).
1 11 USC 541(a).
112 11 USC 362(a).
113 11 USC §§ 544-51. Consider Charles Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptgy ch 6 (Foundation 1997).
These powers enable the trustee, inter alia, to reach back into the past and invalidate an already
completed transfer of value or transaction concluded by the debtor prior to the commencement
of the bankruptcy proceeding.
114 A foreign-judgment creditor may initiate a foreign bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor and
then commence a proceeding for the recognition in the US of a "foreign proceeding." See 11
USC § 1515. A "foreign proceeding" is defined as "collective judicial or administrative proceeding
in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or
adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control
or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation." 11 USC §
101(23). The foreign representative may apply for "any appropriate relief' where such relief
appears "necessary to effectuate the purpose of this chapter and to protect the assets of the
debtor or the interests of the creditors." 11 USC § 1521(a). However, this solution has several
shortcomings: First, it mandates a second involuntary proceeding that needs to be initiated in the
foreign country. This foreign proceeding is unnecessary and wasteful. Second, the "foreign
representative" does not possess the ability to remit assets abroad for distribution in the foreign
case unless "the interests of creditors in the United States are sufficiently protected." 11 USC §
1521(b).
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commencing an involuntary bankruptcyn'1 -can be established only by reference
to the foreign judgment. Assume the creditor won a tort judgment against that
debtor in a foreign forum and now wishes to have the debtor abide by that
foreign judgment," 6 but the foreign-judgment debtor's last assets have been
recently transferred to other creditors in an apparent unlawful preference. 17 In
such a case, the judgment creditor cannot initiate an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding until the foreign judgment is recognized following a (sometimes
lengthy) court hearing. Of course, by the time the foreign judgment is officially
recognized, it is possible that the time limit for avoiding a preference has
expired, and avoidance is no longer possible. 18
Forcing the foreign-judgment creditor to wait until the debtor's defenses
against the foreign judgment are adjudicated and examined-besides being
unfair to the judgment creditor, and unbalanced, as far as the conflicting
interests are concerned-can also thwart attempts by the forum and the foreign
country to cooperate. Indeed, if the foreign judgment is not respected in this
case, what is the point in cooperating in general? If the foreign judgment does
eventually qualify for recognition, it might be too late for the judgment creditor;
the debtor does not have any more assets or the time for the trustee's avoiding
powers may have elapsed. From the foreign country's point of view, refusal by
the forum to allow the foreign-judgment creditor to use the unrecognized
foreign judgment pending formal recognition can be construed as defection.
What happens if the foreign-judgment creditor has initiated a formal
recognition process before the appropriate court at the forum, but at the same
time files the bankruptcy court at the forum in order to initiate an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor? Even if the foreign-judgment creditor
can get what she wants-commencement of the two proceedings in parallel-
there is a risk that the forum will have two conflicting judicial decisions; a
recognition of the foreign judgment by the recognition court and a denial of the
115 See 11 USC 303(b)(1).
116 Recall that 11 USC § 303(b)(1) requires, as a basis upon which an involuntary bankruptcy case can
be commenced, "a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of
a bona fide dispute." Divergent results have been reached regarding whether tort claims upon
which judgment has yet to be rendered constitute contingent claims. Several courts have ruled
that tort claims are dependent upon a judicial finding of liability against the alleged tortfeasor, so
that such claims are considered contingent for purposes the statute. See, for example, Boston
Beverage Corp v Turner, 81 BR 738, 750 (D Mass 1987).
117 See 11 USC § 547(b)(4) (authorizing the trustee to avoid such preferences, made "on or within 90
days before the date of the filing of the petition; or between ninety days and one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider..
118 See id.
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involuntary bankruptcy by the bankruptcy court. What happens if these
decisions conflict as regards the recognition of the foreign judgment?
The new rationale introduced in this Article can solve these problems.
Applying this rationale leads to the conclusion that the basic no-legal-effect rule
for unrecognized foreign judgments should be relaxed, and that an exception to
the rule should be introduced. Indeed, the signaling solution mandates that the
foreign judgment be accorded a default status of a local judgment, at least until a
court of the forum rules otherwise. This insight applies to "emergency"
situations as well. According certain, though limited, legal effect to the
unrecognized foreign judgment can signal to the foreign country in which the
unrecognized judgment was pronounced that the forum is willing to cooperate
with it. Indeed, according the unrecognized foreign judgment a default legal
effect of a local judgment endangers the forum, which might actually be allowing
a practical use for judgments that would not qualify for recognition if examined
de novo. Such a signal is of course observable; but it is also costly and cannot be
imitated by forum countries that prefer, for example, a selective recognition
regime. Such countries cannot allow others to have control over people or
property in their jurisdiction.
The asymmetric information rationale also solves the problem of
conflicting judicial decisions. If the judgment creditor can use the foreign
judgment without having to wait for the completion of the independent formal
recognition procedure, no recognition petition will ever be filed. Moreover, even
an ex post determination that the use of the unrecognized foreign judgment was
inappropriate cannot undermine the decision in the first place to utilize the
foreign judgment. Using foreign judgments that might later turn out as unsuited
for recognition in emergency cases is a price the forum has to pay in order to
induce cooperation with the foreign country under conditions of asymmetric
information.
Factors other than the new economic rationale developed here might
influence the forum's decision as to whether or not unrecognized foreign
judgments are to be effected. For example, the forum might be reluctant to
acknowledge legal effect with regard to judgments declaring a change in a
person's personal status (for example, declaring the marital status of a lesbian
couple); such a rule might threaten the forum's ability to block judgments that
stand in contravention of the forum's public policy. Obviously, a person
interested in having such a judgment recognized by the forum would turn to the
de facto recognition option (contexts in which unrecognized foreign judgments
are accorded legal effect) rather than to a formal recognition process, which
entails an orderly examination of, inter alia, the public policy requirement. Of
course, if the forum chooses this position, it means that the forum prefers to
protect its public policy over promoting its interest in the maximum possible
cooperation with the foreign country; but it is certainly a legitimate preference.
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Be that as is it may, the involuntary bankruptcy example discussed above
demonstrates well the possibility to enhance cooperation through evisceration of
the no-legal-effect rule without having it heavily undermine other interests. To
be sure, initiating an involuntary bankruptcy resembles interlocutory relief. The
judgment creditor is allowed to enjoy the relief of involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings, and the use of foreign judgment is not irreversible. The foreign-
judgment debtor can still, if she wishes to do so, carry the burden to prove that
the foreign judgment does not qualify for recognition by the forum, and have
the involuntary bankruptcy brought to a stop.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have argued that attempts by countries to cooperate in
recognizing each other's foreign judgments are undermined by a problem of
asymmetric information. The forum does not know if the foreign country is less
receptive to the forum's judgments than the forum is to the foreign country's
judgments. The forum also cannot determine whether a foreign country, the
judgments of which the forum is required to accept, adheres to a selective or
sporadic recognition regime in assessing the forum's judgments. This problem of
private information prevents countries from cooperating fully with regard to the
recognition of each other's judgments.
Acknowledging that the core problem of the law of foreign judgments is a
problem of asymmetric information not only enhances our understanding of this
area of the law and also brings about several recommendations. First, a forum
interested in cooperation with a certain foreign country should prefer,
unilaterally, registration of that country's foreign judgments, as the way to locally
effect these judgments, instead of recognition. Second, countries should refrain
from the pursuit of recognition agreements, as such agreements, per se, cannot
guarantee cooperation. Third, insisting on the reciprocity requirement does not
do much to improve cooperation between countries as far as recognition of
foreign judgments is concerned. Finally, the forum should consider developing
an exception to the no-legal-effect rule applying to unrecognized foreign
judgments.
However, further research is necessary in order to improve inter-country
cooperation in recognition of foreign judgments. For example, while the
problem of selective recognition can find its solution in each country adopting
the signals described in the Article, a solution to the problem of sporadic
recognition is still missing.
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